{"id":1138,"date":"2022-01-26T09:53:38","date_gmt":"2022-01-26T14:53:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cognitivewarriorproject.com\/?p=1138"},"modified":"2022-01-26T09:53:38","modified_gmt":"2022-01-26T14:53:38","slug":"daily-dump-the-intersection-of-terrorismgood-governance-and-great-power-competition-not-one-inch-genocide-citizen-resistance-and-more-january-24-26-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cognitivewarriorproject.com\/?p=1138","title":{"rendered":"Daily Dump: The Intersection of Terrorism,Good Governance and Great Power Competition, Not One Inch, Genocide, Citizen Resistance and More \u2013 January 24-26, 2022"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
\n
\n

It is not every day that the headlines are filled with articles that cover the intersection of Good Governance, Terrorism and Great Power Competition (actually it probably is) but for Today\u2019s Daily Dump, that is where we will focus. To demonstrate the convergence of the three we will look at one article from The New York Times and an article from War on the Rocks to discuss Africa and Boko Haram.<\/p>\n

Although there appears<\/a> to be several different terror groups fighting in Burkina Faso (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb<\/a> has been the biggest driver of violence), Boko Haram is thought to be active there. To paint this picture, the who<\/em> is not necessarily as important as the what<\/em> and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was not in the news today. So, before we dive into what is happening now, I think we should to go to The War on the Rocks and Revisiting the Beginning of Boko Haram<\/a> <\/em>for some background and perspective.<\/p>\n

In the late 1990s, a promising teenager named Muhammad Ali lived in north-east Nigeria. His brilliance and maturity made him a natural leader. He was the head of his class in school, and his teachers thought that he had a bright future ahead of him as a medical doctor.<\/em><\/p>\n

Unfortunately, those teachers turned out to be wrong. Ali would go on to establish Boko Haram, one of the most brutal terrorist groups in history. A decade and a half after his death in 2004, at the hands of vigilantes, the conflict between Boko Haram and Nigeria\u2019s security forces has killed an estimated 35,000<\/a> people in north-east Nigeria. The violence has devastated communities, leading to the displacement of over three million<\/a> people, and has plunged millions more into extreme poverty. Today, three different factions of Boko Haram continue<\/a> to target security forces, civil servants, humanitarian workers, and civilians in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad in their bid to establish their version of a puritanical Islamic state.<\/em><\/p>\n

The article dives deep into Muhammad Ali\u2019s early life but for our purposes we are going to fast forward<\/a> to where he became radicalized (emphasis ours):<\/p>\n

Ali studied and became radicalized domestically in north-east Nigeria by reading extremist literature \u2014 some from the Middle East \u2014 and relating this to local issues and grievances<\/strong>. He was inspired by the Taliban and al-Qaeda \u2014 whom he tried to mimic \u2014 and might have been introduced to jihadi literature during a short trip in Sudan, but he never studied in Sudan or elsewhere, nor did he have personal contacts, much less train and fight, with Taliban or Al-Qaeda members in Nigeria or abroad.<\/em><\/p>\n

Like it or not, terror is almost always rooted in politics, governance and as in this case, seemingly unrelated world events. The article continues<\/a> (emphasis ours):<\/p>\n

Ali saw the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as a war on Islam and Muslims globally. Many Muslims across the world viewed the \u201cGlobal War on Terror\u201d as the United States picking on Muslim countries in an attempt to control the world. But Ali and several in his circle took these grievances much further and deeper. They closely followed events in the Middle East and were transfixed by the speeches of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. According to Balarabe, Ali and Yusuf listened to the recordings and read the writings of bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and Ayman al Zawahiri so frequently that they memorized and cited large portions of these speeches in their own preaching. From there, they read and translated jihadi publications into local Kanuri and Hausa languages\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

It was a perfect storm. A multitude of local factors provided a huge market for Boko Haram\u2019s ideas. Poverty, illiteracy, and inequality had alienated millions of young people in northern Nigeria. Political corruption and police brutality had severely damaged the social contract, which has always been fragile. Ethno-religious tensions and violence from the 1980s, unaddressed through the justice system or reconciliation, had led to a huge inter-faith mistrust between Muslims and Christians, and sectarian tensions among Muslim groups had sharpened. Ali and his associates exploited all of these factors.<\/strong> They translated Arabic literature from the Middle East and infused this with locally relevant materials to roll out a massive grassroots campaign of radicalization. They spoke to local populations in their own language about the problems bedeviling them.<\/em><\/p>\n

The article tells the end of Ali\u2019s story but also concludes<\/a> with this important detail when combating terrorism:<\/p>\n

In this case, one might assume that the extremism problem in the Lake Chad region is relatively limited, and focus on addressing the factors that make locals vulnerable to recruitment by external forces. On the other hand, if Boko Haram is instead \u2014 as I argue \u2014 a \u201chomegrown\u201d project conceived and propelled by local actors, then local agency, factors, and grievances should be taken seriously.<\/em><\/p>\n

Which takes us to The New York Times piece, After Coup in Burkina Faso, Protesters Turn to Russia for Help<\/a><\/em>, where the lack of adequate governance, in this case largely driven by terror, has ultimately lead to a coup and a swing to Russia in the Great Power Competition. From the Times:<\/p>\n

The morning after the coup in Burkina Faso, a crowd of revelers celebrating the military takeover in the dusty main plaza of the capital had two messages for the outside world: No to France, and yes to Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cWe want a partnership with Russia,\u201d said Bertrand Yoda, a civil engineer who shouted to make himself heard amid hundreds of horn-honking, cheering people gathered in a raucous show of appreciation for the new military junta. \u201cLong live Russia!\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

Why was there a coup? Back to the Times<\/a> and our story of governance:<\/p>\n

Mutinying soldiers seized power in this poor West African nation on Monday, riding a wave of boiling frustration at the government\u2019s failure to stem surging Islamist violence that since 2016 has displaced 1.4 million people, killed 2,000 and destabilized perhaps two-thirds of a once-peaceful country.<\/em><\/p>\n

And a swing<\/a> in the Great Power Competition:<\/p>\n

The sudden clamor for Moscow\u2019s help was a further sign of how Islamist violence across the Sahel, a vast region south of the Sahara, is upending old alliances and eroding pro-Western, if often weak, democratic political orders.<\/em><\/p>\n

Many people at the protest said they were inspired by Russia\u2019s intervention in the Central African Republic, where Russians guard the president, Russian companies mine for diamonds, and Russian mercenaries fought off an Islamist offensive last year \u2014 as well as a more recent Russian foray into Mali, the country to the north of Burkina Faso.<\/em><\/p>\n

The article<\/a> may be pay-walled so I don\u2019t want to quote too much. If you can, you definitely should read the entire article for more context. It appears that actual Russian troops are unlikely to be on the ground there and they will instead rely heavily on the Wagner Group. For more information on the Wagner Group, you can go here<\/a> but for the purposes of our discussion we can stop there. In these two articles, we are able to see the nexus of how poor governance can give rise to terrorism and ultimately lead to a government overthrow and a major shift in the Great Power Competition.<\/p>\n

Today we have an unusually large Daily Dump due to holding this article for several days and I would like to quickly highlight several other articles\/podcast\/shows before we wrap this up.<\/p>\n

I started listening to the Podcast: Inching Toward War in Europe<\/a><\/em> \u2013 Horns of Dilemma, am about half way through and so far, it has not disappointed. The central theme is, \u201cnot one inch\u201d and how that phrase originally meant NATO would not expand one inch eastward after the fall of the Berlin way but was later redefined as \u201cnot one inch\u201d of Europe would be off limits to NATO expansion.<\/p>\n

I also recently listened to the Podcast: Why People Online Defend the Uighur Genocide<\/a><\/em> \u2013 Angry Planet. I really wanted to like it going in but something struck me the wrong way in the middle. I do have a tendency to overreact so I may have to re-listen to give it a fair shake.<\/p>\n

Over the weekend I saw this THE PLIGHT OF THE GREEN BERET: Why Special Forces is still losing most of its junior leaders and its survivors are forced to contend with a cultural crisis.<\/a><\/em> from Small Wars Journal.<\/p>\n

\n

Key phrase- \u201cSoldiers who worked so hard to become Green Berets are made cogs in a wheel, where their intelligence, resourcefulness, discipline, and persistence is constantly stifled by a command structure of micro-management and risk aversion.\u201d https:\/\/t.co\/ZKElm1OxZj<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 Cognitive Warrior Project (@CognitiveWarri2) January 22, 2022<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n