A series of tweets sent me down a bit of a rabbit hole that I thought I would share with you. It all started with this:
In 1776
James Madison was 25
Alexander Hamilton was 21
James Monroe was 18
Henry Knox was 25
Nathan Hale was 21We coddle our youth.
We should give them more responsibility and expect more of them. pic.twitter.com/s6Lxmt69VG
— History With Jacob (@HistoryWJacob) May 6, 2026
My initial reaction was on the lines of, ” We are raising our kids too soft.” Then I scrolled down to see this…
idk these guys over threw their government, maybe the pacification of young minds has been determined to be the more “stable” path
— Cato (@y0ung3r_c9t0) May 7, 2026
…which modified my thought process to something more like, “Is it the soft bigotry of low expectations for our youth? Or something, as someone stated above, a stabilizing model to defend against youth and idealism?” Then, no kidding, just 3 tweets down in my thread, I come across this banger:
The most educated generation in Chinese history destroyed its own teachers.
We picture totalitarian persecution as the work of soldiers and state militias.
In Mao’s Cultural Revolution, it was run by college students who were completely convinced they were right. 🧵 pic.twitter.com/lReYld3hZM
— Students For Liberty (@sfliberty) May 6, 2026
Come with me into the rabbit hole with Grok! I asked Grok a simple question. What age group is most likely to overthrow a government? According to Grok:
Why This Age Group?
- Demographic “Youth Bulge” Theory: Countries with a large proportion of 15-29 year olds (e.g., >20-40% of adults or where 60%+ of the population is under 30) show significantly higher risks of civil conflict, revolutions, and political violence. This is linked to high youth unemployment, competition for jobs/resources, and a pool of mobile, idealistic recruits with “less to lose.” Risks drop sharply as societies age past a median around 25-30 years.
- Biological and Social Factors: Young adults (especially males) tend to be at peak physical capability, more open to risk-taking, idealistic, and less tied to family/property responsibilities. Older groups often prioritize stability.
Historical Evidence
- American Revolution (1770s): Many soldiers and key figures were in their late teens to mid-20s. Continental Army averages at Valley Forge were around 23-24; numerous leaders (e.g., Lafayette at 18, many signers under 40).
- French Revolution (1789): Protagonists were notably young; revolutionary crowds and militants drew heavily from urban youth.
- Arab Spring (2010s) and Similar Uprisings: Labeled “youth revolutions,” with heavy participation from under-30s (students, unemployed graduates) in Tunisia, Egypt, etc. Protests often led by those 17-31.
- Broader Conflicts: 80%+ of civil conflicts (1970-1999) occurred in countries with large youth cohorts. Revolutionary (non-territorial) conflicts aiming to topple central governments correlate especially strongly with youthful age structures.
Leaders can vary more widely in age (e.g., some older ideologues or military figures), but foot soldiers, protesters, and shock troops skew young.
Key Data and Patterns
- A comprehensive study of world leaders (1945–2023) found coup-accession leaders averaged ~50.7 years (SD 11) at key points, vs. the overall average of ~57. They enter office at the youngest average age among accession types.
- Recent African coups (a hotspot) highlight even younger leaders: many in the 34–41 range (e.g., colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and captains from special forces). Examples include Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso, ~34 at 2022 coup) and others like Assimi Goïta (Mali, early 40s).
- Historical outliers show extremes: some as young as late 20s/early 30s (e.g., Jerry Rawlings at 31, Muammar Gaddafi at 27, Valentine Strasser at 25 in Sierra Leone), but these are rarer; mid-ranking officers in their 30s–40s are common drivers.
Why This Age Range?
- Military hierarchy and opportunity: Coup leaders are often mid- to senior-ranking officers (majors to colonels) who have experience and command but face blocked advancement under older leadership. This peaks in the 35–50 window.
- Risk tolerance and ambition: Enough maturity for coordination/logistics, but still high drive and fewer entrenched ties to the status quo. Younger than typical politicians or generals who rise slowly.
- Context matters: In youthful societies (large “youth bulges”), coups cluster more, often propelled by frustrated younger officers. Coups have declined overall as populations age globally.
Comparison to Overthrows in General
A coup involves a small group—typically military officers, security forces, or insiders—seizing executive power by force or threat, often with minimal bloodshed initially.
-
- How it works: Plotters secure loyalty of key units (e.g., presidential guard, tanks, airports, TV/radio stations). They arrest or neutralize the leader, declare control, and impose a curfew or communications blackout. Success hinges on speed, surprise, and preventing counter-mobilization.
- Types:
- Military coup: Officers overthrow the government (e.g., many in Africa and Latin America).
- Palace coup: Insiders within the ruling circle replace the leader.
- Self-coup: A sitting leader suspends the constitution to consolidate power.
- Soft/judicial coup: Legal or institutional maneuvers with military backing.
- Examples: Gaddafi in Libya (1969, age 27), many West African coups in the 2020s by colonels in their 30s. Coups peaked during the Cold War but remain frequent in fragile states.
Coups often succeed when the military is factionalized or the regime has lost elite support, but many fail due to poor coordination or loyalist resistance.
Broader societal mobilization, often starting with protests and escalating to sustained resistance.
-
- How it works: Triggered by economic crisis, corruption, repression, or “youth bulges.” Organizers build coalitions, use nonviolent tactics (strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations), or armed insurgency. Key is eroding regime legitimacy until security forces defect or refuse orders.
- The 3.5% Rule (Erica Chenoweth): Nonviolent campaigns reaching active participation of ~3.5% of the population have a strong success rate for regime change. Nonviolent movements succeed roughly twice as often as violent ones.
- Examples: Arab Spring (2011), French Revolution (1789), Velvet/Bulldozer Revolutions in Eastern Europe, Sudanese uprising (2019).
Violent revolutions (e.g., Bolshevik 1917, Chinese Communist) often lead to civil war first.
-
- Methods: Invasion, covert operations (funding opposition, propaganda, sabotage), sanctions + internal pressure, or supporting rebels/coups.
- Examples: U.S.-backed coups (e.g., Iran 1953, Chile 1973), NATO in Libya (2011), or historical conquests.
These often backfire, leading to instability or new autocracies.
4. Other or Hybrid Mechanisms
-
- Insurgency/Civil War: Prolonged armed conflict (e.g., many African cases) that eventually topples the center.
- Negotiated/Elite Transition: Pressure forces resignation or elections that oust the regime (sometimes called “color revolutions”).
- Economic Collapse + Defections: Regimes implode when they can’t pay the military or elites abandon them.
- Assassination or Internal Purge Gone Wrong: Rare as standalone, but can trigger chaos.
Factors for Success
-
- Control of coercive forces: Military/police neutrality or defection is decisive.
- Broad support: Isolated plots fail; sustained movements with cross-class alliances succeed more.
- Context: Weak institutions, economic grievances, youth demographics, or external shocks increase vulnerability.
- Outcomes: Many “successful” overthrows lead to new autocracies, civil wars, or instability rather than stable democracy. Failed attempts can strengthen repression.
In practice, most overthrows combine elements (e.g., protests enabling a coup). Purely peaceful, leaderless movements are rare; coordination, resources, and luck play huge roles. History shows overthrows are easier than building stable replacements.