Ron@cognitivewarriorproject.com

Micro-dosing Lithium, Urban Combat, AI, Boko Haram and Other Bullets

Micro-dosing Lithium, Urban Combat, AI, Boko Haram and Other Bullets

Just sitting down to this a little later than normal today. I will be working on some backside stuff on the website over the next couple days so posting may be a little lighter than I would like but I also rediscovered a couple websites that in this craziness I had completely forgotten about. So, todays bullets will be a lot of catch up from them. In addition, I also found some new Speaker Series material that is awesome. Hopefully, I can get to one of those too. Anyway, on to the bullets.

While the health news of the year will be focused on the SARS-CoV-2 virus, suicide remains on track to be the second-leading cause of military deaths, the same as it has been for the past 14 years. The Secretary of Defense, Dr. Mark Esper, says he has no answer for the record levels of military suicides that were recently highlighted when the USS George H.W. Bush suffered a string of three suicides in five days. And he’s not the first to struggle with this issue. Successive heads of the Department of Defense have seen suicide rates increase on their watches.

While Esper struggles with this complex issue, help may come by way of new science. Our answer is something that can be done quickly, cheaply, and non-invasively. It won’t involve more annual training, special programs, or hotlines. It just requires that we acknowledge that our current programs aren’t working, and it requires considering a scientific proposal that has been widely discussed for over twenty years.

Certain regions in the United States, Japan, Austria, and Greece have significantly lower rates of suicide than their neighbors, and many scientists believe it’s something in the water. Specifically, there are higher-than-normal levels of lithium, and a large body of scientific research has suggested that where lithium exists naturally and thus manifests in the drinking water, violent crimes and suicides are statistically far less frequent.

Wow, there is so much here. For those of you that know, I am a former 18D so I know just enough about medicine to be dangerous…at least I used to anyway. But this article challenges my instincts in so many ways. The possible ramifications of wide spread micro dosing of Lithium could have unforeseen effects that are worse than suicide. They make a compelling case but somehow widespread ‘drugging’ of servicemembers terrifies me. READ IT. For me, it is equally terrifying as it is compelling and that is why I consider it the most interesting article of the day.

There are several articles at the Modern War Institute that we are going to discuss today. (This is one of those sites that I followed on twitter but completely forgot about here. A little tidbit about who they are, their Mission:

The Modern War Institute at West Point generates new knowledge for the profession of arms, enhances the West Point curriculum, and provides the Army and the Nation with an intellectual resource for solving military problems. MWI has three mutually supporting functions: Research, Educate, and Integrate.

  • John Spencer hosts a podcast titled: Is Urban Combat the Great Equalizer? They pose the question is Urban Combat the Great Equalizer where they discuss mega cities, personal experience and the units ability to adapt. This is going to need its own post. In fairness, I have not listened to the podcast in its entirety but it sounds really good. They describe the podcast as such:

In this episode of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project podcast, John Spencer is joined by Col. Douglas Winton, chair of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College.

In their conversation, Col. Winton discusses the topic of his PhD dissertation, which questioned the claim that urban warfare is the great equalizer. Many scholars agree that urban terrain reduces military capabilities—including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, aerial assets, and strike capabilities. Beyond that, though, there is a long history of claims that urban combat acts to equalize military power by stripping a militarily superior attacking force of its advantages and turns urban battles into close fighting at the small-unit level, where the inferior and often defending force is granted a degree of parity with the superior attacker. Col. Winton’s research looked at six recent urban battles to determine how true those claims are. He also provides recommendations for what militaries should do to think about and prepare for urban combat.

In 2016, DeepMind’s AI-powered AlphaGo system defeated professional Go grandmaster Lee Sedol. In one game, the AI player reportedly surprised Sedol by making a strategic move that “no human ever would.” Three years later, DeepMind’s AlphaStar system defeated one of the world’s leading e-sports gamers at StarCraft II—a complex multiplayer game that takes place in real time and in a vast action space with multiple interacting entities—devising and executing complex strategies in ways that, similarly, a human player would unlikely do. These successes raise important questions: How and why might militaries use AI not just to optimize individual and seemingly mundane tasks, but to enhance strategic decision making—especially in the context of nuclear command and control? And would these enhancements potentially be destabilizing for the nuclear enterprise?

He then discusses the slippery slope of pre-delegation of authority, how the human element that most of us believe to indispensable then talks about regime types and the dilemmas they would pose. This is a really good article.

I get it. I really do. I’ve been dead for almost 190 years. The world has changed a lot since my time. You have a computer. There weren’t even typewriters around back then—if there were, I might have finished my masterpiece before I died instead of leaving it . . . well, we’ll come back to that. You have the internet, pretending to be a genius on #MilTwitter and cranking out 800-word strategic thinkpieces in a single thread. Please. I had Scharnhorst and actually had to put pen to paper and prove my genius. You have Wikipedia for research. I had Borodino.

So, yeah, I’ve heard your oh-so-original criticism before. You think I’m stuck in the past. My writing is too abstract. My thinking is too kinetic. You and every other armchair strategist with a few years fighting it out on the keyboard know all about war. You sit there in your cushy leather office chair with your copy of John Boyd in one hand and your end-of-tour Bronze Star in the other, dragging me across Twitter to the gleeful squeals of people barely able to communicate in memes. You lean back and smirk condescendingly, “The old Prussian just didn’t get it. War is so much more complex today than he could possibly understand.”

In the interim, installations should continue to develop criteria to guide the resumption of training beyond distributed learning, but do so with caution. In military parlance, a “warm start” that gradually eases units back into pre-COVID-19 training levels is needed. Such an approach also allows commanders to quickly adjust in the event of a second wave. Diligence in doing so, as well as rigorous analysis of our most recent efforts, is expected of professional armies. Moreover, it bolsters efforts to make our forces resistant to similar shocks and gives us an advantage over potential adversaries who don’t make a similar commitment to advancing readiness and protecting the health and safety of their forces.

There is so much good stuff over there that  I could fill pages of links here. It will definitely become a daily stop for me. Hopefully, I will get caught up on most of their recent stuff here and can take the time to some deep dives on their research. I cannot more highly recommend that you stop over and check out the Modern War Institute.

Another website that I had previously read A LOT but for various reasons have drifted away from and have not checked in on since I started this project in War on the Rocks. I often find myself reading certain websites for several months and then drift away. That is part of the reason that I started this, if I could aggregate some of the best stories from a bunch of sources you, the reader, could have a one-stop shop so to speak to take in a wide variety of information. Then as you follow the links you can tell me what I missed. That is the hope anyway. Since we talked our military in response to the coronavirus, let’s talk about another…

The reality of COVID-19 in Russia, of course, is almost certainly much different than official accounts. The first cases are finally being reported, and announcements of forced quarantine in the army shed light on potential viral clusters. The authorities can now only hope to hide the increasing number of cases in the army as it scrambles to limit infections and save lives.

Boulegue takes a look at the progression of the Russian Military response that included readiness checks and mobilizations. He then moves on to institutional matters that include the Military-Industrial Complex and Draft Issues. (I didn’t know they had a draft) Then settles on:

The Russian armed forces are in a unique position to support civilian emergency and medical infrastructure. The country’s health care system is under strain even in good times and will be severely tested during a pandemic. Time will tell whether the military will be able to contain likely viral outbreaks and play the role of a much-needed force multiplier for the civilian response. If the virus is not rapidly contained across the armed forces, “then no hypersonic missiles will help.

It is a very interesting read on how others are taking on the challenge of a global pandemic. It is definitely worth the read if you still even want to read coronavirus stuff.

These are all questions that the government of Chad will need to grapple with. But in the context of the most recent attacks across the Lake Chad sub-region — in which hundreds of people including soldiers were killed — the most important question is how to assure communities that former fighters have been successfully rehabilitated. The issue is increasingly urgent, with residents and local experts expressing concern that the recent upsurge in Boko Haram attacks is due in part to former fighters returning to the group. After an attack in March that killed nearly 100 soldiers, the deadliest terrorist attack in Chad’s history, concerns about recidivism are likely to grow.

Again, this is a very deep dive that covers Chad’s fight against Boko Haram, the conditions on the ground and what drives recruitment of fighters. The key to understanding all insurgencies includes the political and security conditions that drive recruitment. The article looks at similar efforts in Nigeria, which faces many obstacles but the prospects in Chad are reportedly better.

Fortunately, former Boko Haram fighters in Chad do not face the level of physical threats as their Nigerian counterparts. Unlike in Nigeria, where deserters suffer stigmas and death threats from the communities they return to, the situation is very different in Chad. In Nigeria, residents have been deeply resistant to accepting former fighters back into communities, including those who have been rehabilitated, with some locals threatening to kill them if released. By contrast, in Chad, defectors live side-by-side with other residents without fear of physical violence.

It is a very different perspective than what I normally read. Typically, I read about the fight, how to win. I don’t really read much about trying to pick up the pieces and put lives back together. This is definitely something to consider.

As Iran and its proxies ramp up attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and harass American naval vessels in the Persian Gulf — an escalation possibly fueled by Iran’s dismal handling of its coronavirus outbreak — the administration of President Donald Trump appears divided about how to respond. Reports suggest that officials are split between two options — forceful retaliation directly against Iran and more limited reprisals against its Iraqi proxies. But a third strategy exists — one that parts of the administration have been preparing for two years — that would allow the administration to both take the fight to Iran and lower U.S. exposure: namely, recruiting Turkey in a campaign to push back against Iranian forces splayed out across the northern tier of the Middle East.

What a mess. Part of me wants to agree with the author but I believe there are no good choices here. There are so many groups that are vying for power and they all have warts. The U.S. has been placing their hand on the scales there a long time and honestly, I don’t know if the region will ever be stable. I do agree with the authors conclusion.

Fundamentally, a Turkey-based strategy for countering Iran misdiagnoses what ails the Middle East. Iranian aggression is a threat to regional stability and U.S. interests, but it is a symptom, not the disease. So, too, with Sunni radicalism. The problem is political, not military. Empowering one imperial and undemocratic power to fight another, even if successful, would only deepen the Middle East’s troubles and diminish U.S. resources. The United States does need local forces to help contain the Iranian threat. But as it searches for those partners, Washington should see the willingness to fight for their own lands as a virtue, not a vice.

The Department of Defense is under pressure from Congress to expose and correct its white supremacy problem. It’s clear that there is a problem — one not confined to the Army — and a recent troop survey indicates a worrying upward trend in signs of white supremacy in the ranks. But it’s also clear that the department has taken a softball approach to the challenge — as illustrated by the fact that it doesn’t treat membership in white supremacist organizations as a sole rationale for discharge. Worse yet, the services, especially the U.S. Army, have a long habit of venerating those who fought for the Confederacy, both ex-Army oath-breakers like Col. Robert E. Lee and those who never served in the U.S. Army, like Henry L. Benning, whose major relationship to the U.S. Army was that they fought against it. Might one wonder why the services have a poor record combating white supremacy? Maybe it’s because white supremacy is baked in.

Maybe I am being obtuse and don’t see it. That is why I placed this article as the most thought provoking. I often wonder how many people even know the history of these places. I didn’t. Then as I am trying to grapple with this concept, is this racism, I am reminded of Lincoln’s plan for reconstruction post-Civil War.

On December 8, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln offers his conciliatory plan for reunification of the United States with his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction.

… The proclamation addressed three main areas of concern. First, it allowed for a full pardon for and restoration of property to all engaged in the rebellion with the exception of the highest Confederate officials and military leaders. Second, it allowed for a new state government to be formed when 10 percent of the eligible voters had taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Third, the Southern states admitted in this fashion were encouraged to enact plans to deal with the freed slaves so long as their freedom was not compromised.

In short, the terms of the plan were easy for most Southerners to accept. Though the emancipation of slaves was an impossible pill for some Confederates to swallow, Lincoln’s plan was charitable, considering the costliness of the war. With the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, Lincoln was seizing the initiative for reconstruction from Congress. Some Radical Republicans thought the plan was far too easy on the South, but others accepted it because of the president’s prestige and leadership. Following Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, the disagreements over the postwar reconstruction policy led to a heated battle between the next president, Andrew Johnson, and Congress.

In my mind Lincoln knew that if the North made integration almost impossible the war would have tuned into an insurgency and secession of some states inevitable. But, is allowing regions to name their bases after local ‘heroes’ allowed? Most of these bases were named during the time period when Civil War Veterans were dying. Can you lose a war and still have pride? I don’t know the answer to any of these questions. I do know that I don’t want this to be racist but is that enough? Just because the name doesn’t mean anything to me, doesn’t mean its meaningless.

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