Weekly Terror Update: Shiite Militia Attacks, ISIS vs. Al Qaeda and The Drone War

Once again the Tuesday Terror update on Wednesday…I might have to reconsider the name. We are going to do things a little different with our terror update by giving you both reading and listening options. First, we will cover some of the terror articles over the last week and then we will work through our 3 podcasts the we usually discuss.

• The Long War Journal’s Behnam Ben Taleblu writes about Collecting and analyzing Shiite militia attacks against the U.S. presence in Iraq. This is a really deep dive complete with maps and graphs! – Its really good to get a sense of what is going on in Iraq.

There is a growing consensus that attacks against U.S. facilities and personnel in Iraq by Iran-backed Shiite Militia Groups (SMGs) are increasingly becoming a “new normal.” These attacks ebb and flow pursuant to several political conditions, some of which remain outside the control of the U.S. Having both quantitative and qualitative data about each attack can help parse Iranian and allied-Shiite militia intentions, contextualize their strategy, and provide an in-depth understanding for U.S. policymakers and the general public about potential buffers and drivers of escalation in Iraq.

Taleblu tries to make sense of what is driving the Shiite militias by tracking rocket and mortar attacks. He settles on three basic drivers:

 1) Iran responding to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign through its militia network.

2) Pro-Iran forces in Iraq responding to a shifting balance of power; be it on the battlefield, in Baghdad/Iraqi domestic politics, or both. Often, this escalation seeks both political and military ends. For example, the eviction of the U.S. forces from Iraq, or improving the relative position of a militia in the eyes of its patron or peers.

3) Iran and pro-Iran forces responding to the targeted killing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qassem Soleimani and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) Deputy Commander Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad by the U.S.

This is a very detailed article about what drives the attacks, what is intended by the attacks and the potential for an Escalation Spiral. Taleblu compiles all of the ‘attacks’ that can confirmed via open source from May 1, 2019 to April 30, 2020. These attacks present the U.S. with a big problem and Taleblu summarizes it:

All of this points to Washington needing a new modus operandi in Iraq to counter Iran-backed escalation. This plan of action cannot be built off of statements alone, be they about an indistinguishability in U.S. policy between escalation by an Iranian patron or Iraqi proxy, or about generically holding Iran accountable. It will have to be developed from action that weighs the merits of any future military response against a whole host of factors ranging from the needs of the maximum pressure campaign against Iran to the future and sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf region

• Thomas Joscelyn and Caleb Weiss provide an Analysis: Islamic State claims Al Qaeda started a war in West Africa. The report details ISIS and Al Qaeda disputes over the last week and discusses a French offensive in…

the Liptako-Gourma area of Mali and Burkina Faso… Since early April, the French have conducted several operations targeting the Islamic State in this area. It was during this same timeframe that Al-Naba alleges the French avoided operations against JNIM.

A French Foreign Legionnaire was recently killed by an IED as part of this offensive. That blast was also claimed by the Islamic State in Al-Naba.

This is a very good and detailed article about a region that we don’t hear much about. If you want another deep dive, I highly recommend it. Just a warning, they did some quality work here and you can get a bit lost down rabbit holes if you choose!

• Also at The Long War Journal, Bill Roggio writes: Taliban destroys Afghan military outpost in Laghman which reportedly killed 27 Afghan soldiers.

At least 27 Afghan soldiers were killed and nine more remain missing following a Taliban attack on an Afghan National Army outpost in the eastern province of Laghman on May 10.

The Taliban has relentlessly attacked Afghan security forces since the U.S. and the group signed an agreement on Feb 29. that sets the conditions for American forces to withdraw from the country.

If you are an advocate of an Afghanistan withdrawal this is going to be a very disappointing article as Roggio once again details how

The Taliban has increased its attacks on Afghan forces “by more than 70 percent between March 1 [the day after signing the so-called peace agreement with the U.S.] and April 15 compared with the same period a year ago,” Reuters reported.

The Taliban’s surge in attacks has piqued U.S. officials and military commanders. On May 2, General Colonel Sonny Leggett, the spokesman for U.S. Forces -Afghanistan and Resolute Support, released a letter to Taliban spokesman Mujahid calling for “restraint” and a “reduction in violence” in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Ehsan Popalzai, Zamira Rahim, Emma Reynolds and Rob Picheta at CNN report that Infants and mothers killed in attack on Kabul hospital. At least 35 were killed when suicide bombers attacked a hospital and funeral procession in Kabul and Nangahar prompting the Afghan president to resume the offensive against the Taliban.

 “Taliban have rejected our repeated call for a ceasefire, calls for ceasefire don’t mean weakness,” Ghani said. “I once again call on them to embrace peace, which is not only a demand of the government but the nation and international community.”…

The Taliban denied involvement in both attacks…

A recent series of attacks in the Afghan capital have been claimed by ISIS. On Monday, security forces said they had arrested three senior members of the terror group, according to Reuters.

• Over at the Hindustan Times, Shishir Gupta writes: Security forces on red alert over terror bombing threat in Kashmir. I will admit that I have not read much from this source so I don’t know the credibility and I do not normally read about this region but that is what The Congnitive Warrior is supposed to be all about! Right? Anyway, Gupta discusses the Terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed and the potential for terror attack in the Jammu and Kashmir.

Security forces in Jammu and Kashmir have been placed on red alert over the plans of Pakistan-backed terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed to carry out attacks targeting army and paramilitary forces on Monday. Security forces expect the terrorists to carry out the attack using a car bomb or a suicide bomber.

If that is not enough Google ‘Terror Attacks May 2020.’ Lets lighten things up by turning to a familiar voice with John Batchelor interviewing the Long War Journal’s Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio.

The first podcast, which can be found here, discusses last week’s Generation Jihad podcast which we previously discussed here. In this podcast they discuss, how did we get here by looking at the foundational texts of ISIS. The podcast is about 11 minutes.

• They discuss Craig Whiteside’s new book, The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement.
• They first discuss what would have happened if the U.S. did not pull out of Iraq in 2011 and how that created space for the birth of the Islamic State. Had the U.S. remained, ISIS probably would not have been able to organize as effectively.
• They then discuss their backgrounds and the ‘death nail’ for the awakening forces.
• They then get into criticisms of U.S. policy, primarily the erratic-ness of it and the lack of political focus. Not consistent leadership compared the insurgents.
• The insurgencies are still raging in multiple areas.
• Why was the awakening formed? The intimidation and violence of Al Qaeda was a driving force. The tribal leaders were terrified of the Sunni groups and the Shia lead government.
• They state the Islamic State was the only alternative once the U.S. left. Money was not enough. Security was the driver. Once the security of the U.S. was lost, then it was the Iraqi government.  

In the second podcast, they discuss how ISIS and Al Qaeda have had disputes in West Africa. The podcast can be found here, it’s about 8 minutes.

• The podcast starts out discussing the Joscelyn and Weis piece discussed above.
• The detail the ISIS Al Naba’s news letter accusing Al Qaeda of starting a war.
• Able to corroborate a lot of the details from other sources.
• ISIS claims that the problem with Al Qaeda will talk with the U.S. and other parties. Al Qaeda sees negotiation as part of the political process to get threats out of the region so they can achieve their political ends.
• Roggio then discusses his piece above and the increasing Taliban attacks. The U.S. official are complaining about the attacks claiming that the Taliban committed to a reduction in violence even though the Taliban denies they agreed to a reduction of violence.

We will also discuss the Long War Journal’s Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio, latest Podcast Generation Jihad Ep. 9 – The Drone Wars. The podcast posts every Tuesday morning, it’s about an hour and 15 minutes, but is well worth the listen. Today they discuss:

The history of America’s drone campaign against al-Qaeda and ISIS. They discuss some of the drone campaign’s biggest successes, civilian casualties and why the unmanned aerial vehicles are a tactic, not a strategy for defeating terrorist organizations. 

This is a really good podcast that covers the complexity of the campaign and its overall effectiveness. Again, it is really good in that they take a measured approach and discuss the successes and limitations of this tactic. I did the best I could to take notes but you should really listen for yourself if you have time. In their latest episode:

• They talk about how the US has come to rely on drones for targeted killing of jihadists leaders. The US has relied on this as a tactic over time. They have become a favorite for political leaders due to the risk of loss of life.
• Will discuss the use of drones outside the major areas of operation or active hostilities. Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia…
• The list some of the first drone strikes…2008 35 strikes. 2010 Pakistan 110 strikes after 2010 strikes tapered off. Last strike in Pakistan was 2018.
• North and South Waziristan ~90% account for the majority of strikes even though Al Qaeda operates in many other parts of Pakistan.
• The Long War Journal maintains a database of all of the drone strikes by country. You can find that database here.
• 2004 there was a turning point where the US made their first strike on Al Qaeda outside of Afghanistan. This was a strategy change and takes into account the Wheel of Jihad that we discussed here. The drone data shows the cross pollination of the Jihadi groups.
• To track the drones, they tried to peer into the ‘black box’ because the US does not always have press releases. Sometimes they rely on sources and statements from Jihadist. The Pakistani Jihadists were helpfully chatty. Pakistan press was helpful.
• They turn a bit toward civilian casualties and note that the Jihadis would usually later play up the numbers of civilians killed as part of the information campaign. (First reports were usually the most reliable on numbers) To do this they would go by publicly available information. Always higher than US reporting.
• Tracking a covert campaign that was half-way in the open is difficult. The reason this tactic was developed was to limit civilian casualties. Could have used B-52s. Some critics only focus on civilian casualties.
• Impossible to fight bloodless war. Impossible to find accurate numbers of civilian deaths, believe their numbers might be off due to information campaign on both sides.
• No strike recorded since 2018 doesn’t mean they are not happening but they have not seen public reporting that has confirmed. The US military uses the Long War Journals tracking in open source briefing. They think their information is close but admit not perfect.
• Difficult to determine who gets killed, reports are usually caveated, because they are based on various open source information. Actually, had a jihadist reach out to them because of their reporting.
• Sometimes the US used facts and evidence for signature strikes which means they didn’t know exactly who they were killing. In 2010, 113 strikes. Lol…striking the Al Qaeda piñata and you never know who will fall out due to the mixing of groups.
• They wish they could have been in a tactical operations center just to see how this all comes together.
• List of high value targets that have been killed in the drone campaign….(I cannot find it or I would link to it)
• Who were the US targeting? – jihadists the plotted against the west, the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani operatives. The idea is to suppress threats against the west and can they can have many ‘hats’ so to speak.
• The drone campaign is not a strategy – will discuss the Bin Laden files in a future podcast. The strikes were a medium tempo. The jihadis state that these hurt but not critical. Ultimately, this is not enough to end the threat. This reminds me of the Book Discussion we talked about here.
• Problem, Al Qaeda is in a lot of other places in Pakistan which causes big problems to finish off the groups. Took-out a lot of key leaders but cannot get all. Bin Laden files gave a very interesting look at how the drone strikes were affecting them.
• May 2013, Obama quoted Bin Laden wrote, “we could lose the reserves to enemy airstrikes, we could not fight air strikes with explosives.” These were cherry picked lines because Bin Laden knew how to avoid. Then they provide the full quote which you will have to listen too, the full quote puts a completely different perspective on Bin Laden position and what Obama claimed in the speech.
• However, the campaign was effective enough that Bin Laden moved some senior leaders into Afghanistan which was SAFER. They know this from the Bin Laden files and tracking senior leaders that become killed there.
• The conversation then moves from Pakistan to Yemen…and how the drone campaign moves. Pretty effective AQAP decapitation, but there is always someone waiting to take control of the organizations. Sometimes, it makes the organization better.
• Clearly the drone campaign is having an effective, but it is hard to determine how effective. The best indicator of its effectiveness is AQAP is complaining about it!
• The jihadist groups probably have re-established better counter intelligence to limit the effectiveness there. They then talk a bit about killing Al Awlaki’s son (16), make the case about not loosing site of who he really is. They, Al Qaeda, memorializes him as a ‘lion of jihad.’
• The issue is, the jihadists use civilians as a cover. Actually, capturing them is very problematic and causes civilian casualties also not to mention risks to US personnel.
• Talk about new technology of missiles that limit civilian casualties, can kill a single jihadist in a car full of people?!
• Overall, they defend the civilian casualties on an impossible task and the nature of warfare / enemy.
• Biggest complaint is that Anwar Al Awlaki was not charged and tried with treason in absentia. Another US citizen actually put out a publication stating that they were proud of their treason against the US. They make the case that this would help ‘justify’ the campaign.
• Where does the US stand in the drone campaign today? – Other countries, the UK, is using them occasionally. Some jihadists are using them, ISIS used in Mosul to drop grenades on tanks, but specifically they focus on the US.
• The focus has now moved to Somalia targeting Al Shabab’s leadership, more than 55 strikes in last year. They believe that Al Shabab controls 25% of Somalia. These strikes hurt them, but the jihadists are resilient. The jihadist leadership turnover is not as fast as ours because of natural progression, rotating commanders and troops, can maintain leadership for years! Killing jihadists that have been fighting since the 1990s!
• A drone campaign is not enough.
• There are some limited strikes in Libya and it is unclear what the future is there. The French forces may be taking over?
• These groups are not going away. Key figures are waiting in the wings to take over.

That was really good. If you are either supportive or critical of the drone campaign you should give a listen as it is a very measured account of the both the successes and limitations. Joscelyn and Roggio stress that this is a tactic not a strategy. Please don’t just rely on my notes. Use my notes to guide your thoughts while you listen. Again, this was really good. If I missed something important, please let us all know in the comments.