I have been thinking about the China, Great Power Competition and the South China Sea for quite some time and, honestly, have written quite a bit about this topic since I started this project. You can search China and see the many examples, but for easy reference you can go here, here or here.
Recently, given the Philippines strategy of assertive transparency, China’s actions aggression has been front and center in my X-feed. While video of water cannons and Chinese Coast Guard stand offs with tiny fishing boats makes compelling content, I have often wondered if video evidence of Chinese bully tactics in the South China Sea will be enough for the Philippines to re-assert their rightful claims to their own exclusive economic zone or do they need to do something more radical? Should they approach the China problem as a Maritime Counterinsurgency or even more radical, a Maritime Insurgency? Admittedly, I did not think of these options on my own. The origin story for this post begins with a tweet…
Superb new report out from @Helmus and his team at @RANDCorporation on “Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Includes in-depth discussion of Maritime Counterinsurgency pp 44-54. Read the whole thing.https://t.co/EjxBOTPNbC
— Hunter Stires (@HunterStires) November 22, 2024
Was amplified with a podcast…
Which led to an office discussion, and ultimately this post where I asked a generative AI tool, “What are the components of a maritime insurgency?” and “Provide examples of a maritime insurgency.”
In regards to the Philippines and the South China Sea, which would it be: an insurgency or counterinsurgency? Honestly, I could make an argument either way but is really boils down to, who you believe controls the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines? Do the Philippines control it, or have they already been displaced by China’s actions? From the Philippine perspective, I can understand why you would want to label it a counterinsurgency because, in a way, that emphasizes their argument of territorial control and legitimacy. But in practice, given the islands that China has already occupied? I lean more toward the Philippine response needing to be more of an insurgency in practice. To be fair, the Philippines could call it counterinsurgency but employ insurgent tactics as part of their response.
For reference, the U.S. Naval Institute and others have labeled China the insurgent and have proposed counterinsurgency and there is plenty to read about it. Here are just a few examples:
The Maritime Counterinsurgency Project Begins – US Naval Institute
An Underutilized Counterinsurgency Asset – The U.S. Coast Guard – Army University Press
Countering China’s Maritime Insurgency with Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces – Center for International Maritime Security
South China Sea: U.S. Must Draw a Line on China’s “Grey Zone” Threats – Geopolitical Monitor
However, for today, we will frame this as a maritime insurgency. Given my background in Special Operations, I have studied a bit about insurgencies but maritime insurgency? I didn’t really know where to begin, so I figured I would ask AI. What does AI think are the components of a maritime insurgency? Let’s start with the definition (I am not sure how to cite AI, but this is not from me):
A maritime insurgency refers to a type of asymmetric warfare that takes place in a maritime environment, where non-state actors or insurgent groups use tactics such as piracy, terrorism, and sabotage to disrupt maritime trade, shipping, and naval operations.
Regardless of what you may think of the source, I like that definition, and it opens your aperture when you have only studied traditional ground-based insurgencies. So, what are the components or key elements? Again, AI:
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- Insurgent Groups: These are the non-state actors or organizations that are waging the insurgency. They can be motivated by a range of factors, including political, economic, or ideological goals. Examples of insurgent groups that have been involved in maritime insurgency include the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Somali pirate groups.
- Maritime Tactics: Maritime insurgents use a range of tactics to achieve their objectives, including:
- Piracy: Attacking and hijacking ships to steal cargo, demand ransom, or disrupt trade.
- Terrorism: Using violence or threats to intimidate or harm people, damage infrastructure, or disrupt operations.
- Sabotage: Damaging or destroying ships, ports, or other maritime infrastructure to disrupt operations.
- Smuggling: Using maritime routes to smuggle people, goods, or contraband.
- Support Networks: Maritime insurgents often rely on support networks to provide them with funding, supplies, and intelligence. These networks can include:
- Financiers: Individuals or organizations that provide funding for the insurgency.
- Logistical Support: Networks that provide supplies, such as food, fuel, and ammunition.
- Intelligence: Networks that provide information on ship movements, naval operations, and other maritime activities.
- Maritime Environment: The maritime environment provides a unique set of challenges and opportunities for insurgent groups. This includes:
- Geography: The use of coastal areas, islands, and other maritime features to launch attacks or hide from authorities.
- Shipping Lanes: The use of busy shipping lanes to target merchant vessels or naval ships.
- Ports and Infrastructure: The use of ports, harbors, and other maritime infrastructure to launch attacks or disrupt operations.
- Psychological Operations: Maritime insurgents often use psychological operations to intimidate or demoralize their opponents, including:
- Propaganda: Spreading false or misleading information to influence public opinion or undermine the morale of opposing forces.
- Threats: Making threats against ships, ports, or other maritime targets to create fear and uncertainty.
- Adaptive Strategies: Maritime insurgents often adapt their strategies in response to changes in the maritime environment or the actions of opposing forces. This can include:
- Changing Tactics: Switching from one tactic to another, such as from piracy to terrorism.
- Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities in the maritime security architecture, such as weaknesses in port security or ship protection.
- External Support: Maritime insurgents may receive external support from other countries, organizations, or individuals, including:
- State Sponsorship: Support from a state or government, which can include funding, supplies, or military equipment.
- Non-State Actors: Support from other non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations or criminal groups.
These components can vary depending on the specific context and the goals of the insurgent group. Understanding these components is essential for developing effective strategies to counter maritime insurgency and protect maritime trade, shipping, and naval operations.
I can’t argue with much there and if you are interested in AI’s sources, I have listed them on the bottom of this post. (You could probably read for a week with this list alone). And in case you were curious about historic examples of maritime insurgencies. AI has you covered there too:
Here are some examples of maritime insurgencies:
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- Somali Piracy (2000s-2010s): Somali pirates, often affiliated with insurgent groups such as al-Shabaab, attacked and hijacked ships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, demanding ransom and disrupting global trade.
- Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, 1990s-present): The Abu Sayyaf Group, a militant organization, has been involved in maritime insurgency in the Philippines, including kidnappings, bombings, and attacks on ships and ports.
- Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka, 1980s-2009): The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, waged a maritime insurgency against the Sri Lankan government, using sea-based attacks and bombings to disrupt shipping and naval operations.
- Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines, 1970s-1990s): The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a separatist organization, waged a maritime insurgency in the Philippines, using attacks on ships and ports to press for independence.
- Viet Cong (South Vietnam, 1960s-1970s): The Viet Cong, a communist insurgency, used maritime tactics, including ambushes and bombings, to attack South Vietnamese and US naval vessels during the Vietnam War.
- Irish Republican Army (UK, 1970s-1990s): The Irish Republican Army (IRA) waged a maritime insurgency against the UK, using bombings and attacks on ships and ports to press for Irish independence.
- Hamas (Gaza, 2000s-present): Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist organization, has been involved in maritime insurgency, using attacks on Israeli naval vessels and ports to disrupt shipping and naval operations.
- Hezbollah (Lebanon, 1980s-present): Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist organization, has been involved in maritime insurgency, using attacks on Israeli naval vessels and ports to disrupt shipping and naval operations.
Some specific examples of maritime insurgency attacks include:
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- USS Cole bombing (2000): Al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole, a US Navy destroyer, while it was refueling in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors.
- SuperFerry 14 bombing (2004): The Abu Sayyaf Group bombed the SuperFerry 14, a Philippine-registered ferry, killing over 200 people.
- MV Leila bombing (2002): The Tamil Tigers bombed the MV Leila, a Sri Lankan-registered ship, killing 14 people.
- Sea Dragon operation (1972): The Viet Cong attacked and sank several US and South Vietnamese naval vessels during the Sea Dragon operation, a maritime insurgency campaign during the Vietnam War.
These examples illustrate the range of maritime insurgency tactics and the various groups that have employed them to achieve their goals.
Interestingly, the Philippines does have experience in this realm which might make them uniquely qualified to combat China. In addition, their recent policy of assertive transparency could be considered both an insurgent or counterinsurgent tactic. So, given our AI generated definition of maritime insurgency what do I think?
Well, I not quite sold…yet. China has undoubtedly employed insurgent tactics to gain territorial control and currently, I think the Philippines are combatting China rather effectively. There is no question that they have gained the high ground by openly displaying China’s aggression in the South China Sea, but the moral high ground is not going to dislodge China’s Coast Guard from the Scarborough Shoal and eventually their tactics are going to have to change. Will it be counterinsurgency or will they have to fight an insurgency to extract cost on China? I do not know, but I do know the Philippines need to be prepared to take the next step, and I believe the next phase will be directly combatting the Chinese aggression with tactics that go beyond the video tape.
AI Sources:
Here are some sources that support the components of a maritime insurgency that I listed earlier:
- Insurgent Groups:
- “Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability” by Peter Chalk (2008) – This book discusses the threat of maritime terrorism and the role of insurgent groups in perpetuating it. [1]
- “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Zachary Abuza (2005) – This article provides an in-depth analysis of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a militant organization that has been involved in maritime insurgency in the Philippines. [2]
- Maritime Tactics:
- “Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Global Overview” by Peter Lehr (2013) – This article provides an overview of piracy and maritime terrorism, including the tactics used by insurgent groups. [3]
- “Maritime Sabotage: A Threat to Global Trade” by Andrew Erickson (2012) – This article discusses the threat of maritime sabotage and its potential impact on global trade. [4]
- Support Networks:
- “The Financing of Maritime Terrorism” by Tamara Makarenko (2004) – This article discusses the financing of maritime terrorism and the role of support networks in providing funding and logistical support to insurgent groups. [5]
- “The Logistics of Maritime Terrorism” by John Harrison (2011) – This article provides an analysis of the logistical support networks used by maritime terrorist groups. [6]
- Maritime Environment:
- “The Geography of Maritime Insurgency” by James Kraska (2011) – This article discusses the geographical factors that contribute to maritime insurgency, including the use of coastal areas and shipping lanes. [7]
- “Maritime Infrastructure and the Threat of Terrorism” by Michael Richardson (2013) – This article discusses the vulnerability of maritime infrastructure to terrorist attacks. [8]
- Psychological Operations:
- “The Psychology of Maritime Terrorism” by Max Abrahms (2012) – This article discusses the psychological factors that contribute to maritime terrorism, including the use of propaganda and threats. [9]
- “Maritime Terrorism and the Media” by Peter Chalk (2011) – This article discusses the role of the media in perpetuating maritime terrorism and the use of psychological operations by insurgent groups. [10]
- Adaptive Strategies:
- “Adaptive Strategies in Maritime Insurgency” by James Russell (2015) – This article discusses the adaptive strategies used by maritime insurgent groups, including the use of changing tactics and exploiting vulnerabilities. [11]
- “The Evolution of Maritime Terrorism” by Bruce Hoffman (2017) – This article provides an analysis of the evolution of maritime terrorism and the adaptive strategies used by insurgent groups. [12]
- External Support:
- “State Sponsorship of Maritime Terrorism” by Daniel Byman (2008) – This article discusses the role of state sponsorship in supporting maritime terrorism. [13]
- “The Role of Non-State Actors in Maritime Insurgency” by Sarah Knott (2016) – This article discusses the role of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and criminal groups, in supporting maritime insurgency. [14]
“Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability” by Peter Chalk (2008)
“The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Zachary Abuza (2005)
“The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Rohan Edrisinha (2010)
“The Viet Cong: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Douglas Pike (1986)
“The Irish Republican Army: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by J. Bowyer Bell (1997)
“Hamas: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Matthew Levitt (2006)
“Hezbollah: A Study of the Group’s History, Ideology, and Operations” by Magnus Ranstorp (1997)
Note: The sources listed are a selection of academic and scholarly works on the topic of maritime insurgency and are not exhaustive.